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THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE*
By Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin, LL.D., Governor of Connecticut.
I venture to formulate as the fundamental principles of crim-
inal justice the following list:
i. The person accused should have fair notice of the charge
against him, and a fair opportunity to make answer, with the aid
of witnesses and counsel.
2. The tribunal which hears his case should be so constituted
as to be reasonably independent of executive or legislative dicta-
tion as to the judgment to be pronounced.
3. The sentence, in case of conviction, should be imposed by
that tribunal.
4. It should be promptly and publicly made known to the con-
vict.
5. In framing it regard should be had (a) to the nature and
gravity of the offense; (b) to the intent of the offender, and the
fault to be imputed to him; (c) to the natural effect of the
punishment awarded, in preventing the commission of similar
offenses, whether by himself or others, and in satisfying the pub-
lic conscience; and (d) when not capital, to its possible utility in
improving his moral character.
In asking whether this is an adequate statement of the con-
trolling rules of action, particularly with relation to the nature of
the sentence, it may not be without interest to examine the
impression in regard to them of the people of the United States.
Forty years ago, the delegates from our country to the first
meeting of the Congras International Pbndtentiairc, at London,
came provided with quite a different declaration of the principles
which should govern criminal procedure. Among them were
that punishment was inflicted on an offender with the special
object of preventing, by his reformation, his falling again into
crime, and the general object of protecting society; (Proceedings
of the Congress, I, xxiii) ; and that definitive sentences ought
*In preparing this article free use has been made of a Rapport on
the Indeterminate Sentence, made by the author to the Con grs Interna-
tional Pcniteniiaire held at Washington in October, 1910.
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to be replaced by indeterminate ones, so that when the convict
was morally cured he could be discharged (lx). These propo-
sitions had been adopted by a Congress of American penologists,
held shortly before at Cincinnati, but it can hardly be claimed that
they reflected the general sentiment of our people.
This must be sought in our laws rather than our newspapers;
from the opinions of those whom the people have commissioned
to execute these laws rather than from those of pure theorists
and humanitarians, or even of prison authorities, who are subject
to the direction of others and speak without that sense of responsi-
bility which attends the possession of plenary power.
We are speaking of fundamental principles. The place to
look for these in America is in our Constitutions of government,
considered in connection with the settled social usages and insti-
tutions in view of which they have been framed.
Limits of space forbid the discussion at length of more than
one point of difference. In the list of principles above formu-
lated, there is no reference to the indeterminate sentence. Is
this a justifiable omission?
The principle which underlies it is that sentences should not
fix any term of imprisonment, but leave its duration to be deter-
mined wholly by subsequent events.
The Congras International Pinitentiaire gave it a qualified
recognition at its meeting at Washington in 191o, but it is prob-
able that had the session been held in any European country a
different result would have been reached. The composition of
any such international conference is necessarily affected by its
seat. Most of the members in attendance will come from the
country which plays the part of host, and any measure that is
pushed by them is likely to prevail. It was so with the Wash-
ington Congress. At previous meetings quite different ground
had been taken. At that of 1885, it was voted that the law fixes
the maximum penalty, absolutely and finally, but that it should
fix the minimum penalty, subject to its abridgement by the Judge,
in view of any attenuating circumstances not foreseen by the law.
At its meeting at Brussels in 189o it was determined that the
system of indeterminate sentences was inadmissible, but the
parole system and the progressive prolongation of terms of
imprisonment for recidivists, were approved.
Many theorists and groups of theorists, here and elsewhere,-
probably here more than elsewhere,-have advanced the principle
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of the indeterminate sentence, but no government has yet made
it, in its integrity, the basis of legislation. No such form of
sentence, it is believed, has, until quite recent years, ever been
known in practice (except in commitments of the young or of
first offenders to reformatories) save under a despotic form of
government, where the pleasure of the sovereign may not unfitly
be thus expressed. Not long since, New South Wales adopted
the indeterminate sentence for habitual criminals, and New
Zealand, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania have followed
her lead. This action, however, it will be observed, is directed
to the single class of incorrigible recidivists, and is primarily
designed to prolong, not shorten, their term of confinement. But
even as to them, it may well be questioned if a sentence to life,
reserving a power of parole, would not better meet the demands
of society.
To be sent to prison, there to remain during the pleasure of
any man or set of men, hardly comports with the spirit of modern
government. It is true that in most countries there is a power
of pardon in the executive authority, which practically makes
every sentence such. But the judgment of the law is fixed. If
pardon comes, it is not as part of the sentence, but in subsequent
mitigation of it. It can also be accepted or refused, at the pleas-
tire of the prisoner.
But as the phrase is used in the United States, the "indetermin-
ate sentence" is understood to include judicial sentences to
imprisonment in which no term is fixed, but which are pro-
nounced under statutes providing that in all cases a person so
sentenced shall be imprisoned for not less or more than a certain
term particularly named in such statutes. The sentence and the
statute are thus read together and have a concurrent and com-
bined action.
Our American Constitutions, State and national, carefully pro-
vide that the accused shall have his fair "day in court"; and gen-
erally add that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted.
The only other prohibitions, as to the modes of punishment,
affecting the question now under discussion, are the following:
MIaryland, in 1776, and again in 1851, 1864, and 1867, declared
(Sec. XIV) that sanguinary laws ought to be avoided, so far as
is consistent with the safety of the State.
South Carolina, in 1778 (Art. XI), provided that "the penal
laws, as heretofore used, shall be reformed, and punishments
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miade in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more propor-
tionate to the crime." This was omitted in her Constitution of
1790.
New Hampshire, in 1784, (Art. XVIII) provided that "all
penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes
of theft, forgery and the like which they do to those of murder
and treason: where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted
against all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinc.
tion in the crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant
with as little' compunction as they do those of the lightest dye.
For the same reason, a multitude of sanguinary laws is both
impolitic and unjust; the true design of all punishment being to
reform, not to exterminate mankind," This was substantially
re-enacted in 1792 and i902'.
Ohio, in i8o2 (Sec. 14) copied this New Hampshire provision.
In her Constitution of 1851 it was omitted,
Illinois, in 1818 (Sec. 14) provided that "All penalties shall be
proportioned to the nature of the offense, the true design of all
punishment being to reform, not to exterminate mankind,."
It will be observed that it is the reformation of the race, not of
the convicts in particular, that is contemplated in all these declara-
tions. In her Constitution of 1870, Illinois dropped (See. ii)
all reference to reformation.
Maine, in 1819, (Sec. 9) provided that "Sanguinary laws shall
not be passed; all penalties and punishments shall be propor-
tioned to the offense."
Arkansas, in 1836, provided (Sec. 13) that "all penalties shall
be reasonable and proportioned to the nature of the offense";
and reaffirmed this in 1864 (Sec. 13). In her Constitution of
i868 this clause was struck out.
Rhode Island, in 1842, provided that "All punishments ought
to be proportioned to the offense."
Indiana, in i85i, declared (Sec. i8) that "the penal code shall
be founded on the principles of reformation and not of vindictive
justice."
Oregon, in 1857, expressed the same purpose (Sec. I5) thus:
"Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the prin-
ciples of reformation, and not of vindictive justice."
Kansas, in 1857, provided, in her Lecompton Constitution (Sec.
I I) that "all penalties shall be reasonable, and proportionate to
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the nature of the offense." Neither in her Mineola Constitution
of 1858, nor in the Wyandotte. Constitution of 1859 is there any
provision on this subject. West Virginia, in 1863 and again in
1872, provided that "penalties shall be proportioned to the char-
acter and degree of the offense."
Louisiana, in 1864, provided (Art. 94) that "all penalties shall
be proportioned to the nature of the offense." This is omitted
in the Constitutions of 1868, 1879, and 1898.
Nebraska included it in her Constitution of 1875 (Sec. 15).
Montana, in 1889, provided (Sec. 24) that "Laws for the pun-
ishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reforma-
tion and prevention, but this shall not affect the power of the
legislative assembly to provide for punishing offenses by death."
Wyoming, in 1889, provided (Sec. 15) that "The penal code
shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and pre-
vention."
ichigan, in 19o2, amended her Constitution (Sec. 47) by
inserting a provision that "the legislature may by law provide for
the indeterminate sentences, so-called, as a punishment for crime,
on conviction thereof, and for the detention and release of persons
imprisoned or detained on said sentences."
It thus appears that by only sixteen of the forty-five American
States, Constitutions, apart from a general prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments, have the principles on which punish-
ment for crime should be based been defined and that of these
there are five (those of Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Ohio and
South Carolina) in which the attempt at such a definition, after
being once made, was later abandoned and has not been repeated.
Of the eleven which remain, three (those of Maine, Maryland,
,and New Hampshire) discountenance or forbid sanguinary laws;
seven (those of Illinois, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire,
Nebra5Ra, Rhode Island and West Virginia) require that the
penalty be proportioned to the nature of the offense; one (that
of New Hampshire) declares that the true design of all punish-
ments is to reform mankind; two (those of Indiana and Oregon)
state more definitely that they should be determined on the prin-
ciples of reformation and not of vindictive justice; and those of
two others (Montana and Wyoming) declare that the proper
principles are -those of reformation and prevention.
In that of one (Michigan) there is an express allowance, but
not requirement, of the indeterminate sentence. It was inserted
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by an amendment adopted in view of a decision of the Supreme
Court of that State that, without it, an indeterminate sehtence
could not be authorized by the legislature.1
It is the right of any State thus to vary its mode of administer-
ing criminal justice, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States does not forbid it, provided that no
persons or classes of persons are thereby deprived of an equal
and impartial treatment under the statutes.2  It is for each
State to determine for itself whether it will or will not in such
matters adhere inflexibly to a total severance of executive and
judicial powers.3
If then, in the United States, the birthplace of the indeter-
minate sentences, they are ignored in the Constitutions of all but
one, while in the few that define the object of punishment but
five refer to reformation of character, it would seem that there
is, to say the least, no general conviction on the part of govern-
ments that terms of imprisonment should not (subject of course
to the pardoning or paroling power) be definitely fixed by the
court of conviction.
There are certainly strong reasons why this should be done.
The convict then knows the worst that is before him. He can
lay his plans with assurance as to his employment after his dis-
charge. He has received such a sentence as has approved itself
to the magistrate or jury before whom his trial took place and
who presumably have the best means of determining the degree
of his guilt, the nature of his temptation, and all circumstances
of extenuation. The sovereign whose laws he has violated has
received such satisfaction as was deemed sufficient, no greater
and no less. The individuals whom he may have wronged have
had an opportunity to compare his term of confinement with the
measure of his guilt. The sense of public justice in the com-
munity at large is offended and every rogue, on the contrary, is
encouraged, if punishment be not adequate and certain.
The sentence of the trial court is imposed at a time when the
attention of the community has been concentrated on the crime
and criminal. If it be the case of a first offense or an over-
mastering opportunity hastily embraced and soon regretted, sym-
I People v. Cummings, 88 Michigan Reports, 249.
2 Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 United States Reports, 481, 487.
3 Deyer v. Illinois, 187 United States Reports, 71, 83.
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pathy will find voice both within and without the court-room. It
is the business of the judge to consider all and everything that
bears on the measure of justice to be dealt out.
"Judicis oflhiint est, ut res, ita tempora rerum
Quaerere; quaesito tempore, tutus eMs."
Nor are the concomitants of an offense less to be regarded
when they are such as to aggravate it. The community must be
made secure, and the criminal himself shares in the benefit of its
security.
Other considerations might easily be suggested; but enough
has been said to justify our now passing on to inquire as to the
propriety of adding to the definite sentence supplemental penal-
ties, in the case of particular individuals.
A general law affixing a certain penalty, in all cases of convic-
tion of a certain crime, other than imprisonment and in addition
to it, would not fall within the scope of the question. Such a
law would be self-executing and become virtually a part of the
judicial sentence. The point proposed for discussion is whether
it is not -wise to vest in the trial court a discretion to treat some
convicts with more severity than others found guilty of a similar,
or perhaps of the same offense.
The response must clearly be in the affirmative.
The hardened criminal should be punished more severely than
the man who has committed his first offense. He who is able in
some measure to repair his fault by making compensation to any
suffering damage from it, should be compelled to do so, on pain
of suffering a longer imprisonment, in courts and countries where
the effectual union of civil and criminal causes of action is per-
missible. It is to be regretted that in the United States, owing
to the prevailing rule requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
to warrant a conviction for crime, while a mere preponderance of
evidence supports a civil judgment, such proceedings are prac-
tically impossible, and therefore are unknown.4
Perhaps the nearest approach to them is made by the Act of
Congress (U. S. Revised Statutes, Sec. 3350) under which a
considerable fine is imposed on a master or mariner who seduces
a female passenger upon his ship and the court may order it paid
to her or to the child, if any, whose birth may follow the offense.
4 See the author's Rapport sur la Question, Quels seraieut, dans l'ordre
d'idjes indiqui, etc.,Actes de Congr's Pinitentiaire International de Bru.x-
riles, 1900, Tome II, 9.
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In countries where civil and criminal proceedings cannot well
be joined, it is however possible to distinguish between offenders,
by authorizing the recovery of punitive damages in a civil action
where the offense seems to the court before which such an action
may be tried, to call for an exemplary judgment. Instead of
simple compensatory damages, double or treble damages might
be allowed when the party injured has suffered a peculiar loss, or
other circumstances enhance the wrong; as for instance, if the
party to be sued be a man of high station or large means, who
has betrayed the trust placed in him by society when it clothed
him with such advantages over the mass of his fellow men.
It might to that end be provided by statute that on conviction
of any offense involving pecuniary loss to another it could be
made part of the sentence that the defendant should be liable to
a civil action in the name and at the expense of the government
for exemplary damages, provided the sufferer so desires; and
that the amount recovered, less the actual cost of the suit, should
be paid over to the latter for his own use.
Penalties in addition to imprisonment under a determinate sen-
tence may properly be imposed upon the apparently incorrigible
when convicted of a serious offense. That of imprisonment for
life would not be too great for some recidivists, subject only to
the possibility of pardon. For lesser offenders the court might
well have a discretion whether or not to decree a deprivation of
the elective franchise or of eligibility to public office or private
trust. It would be a needed protection to the public in some
cases; a cruel and uncalled-for burden in others.
So a maintenance of police supervision, after service of a full
term of imprisonment, enforced by a duty to report to the proper
officials, at stated intervals, might be an appropriate means of
keeping one man within the lines of good conduct, while it would
as naturally tend to degrade and ruin another.
On the other hand, to give by law, either to the trial judge or
to administrative authorities power to soften a sentence to a fixed
term of imprisonment by ordering an earlier release in case of
good conduct or other circumstances, warranting such a mitiga-
tion, is undoubtedly often productive of the happiest consequences.
The determinate sentence may, in ways like these, be made
hardly more rigid than the indeterminate sentence; but the flex-
ibility will come from the action of the courts which convict, or
from the operation of a positive law. In either case, it will pro-
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ceed from those to whom the discharge of one of the three great
functions of government has been entrusted. Under the prin-
ciple of the indeterminate sentence, flexibility comes from the
action of subordinate officials representing directly neither the
legislative, the judicial, nor the executive department of political
sovereignty. Thus coming from a lower source it must, on prin-
ciple, be less likely to express the public will.
It will also be more affected by individual sympathy and per-
sonal solicitation.
During this year a young man living in New York committed
suicide, while under charges of having violated and then mur-
dered a girl of twelve. There was little doubt of his guilt. On
examining his record, it was found that he had been, a few years
before, convicted of the violation of a girl of fourteen, com-
mitted to a reformatory, and released on parole after a brief
imprisonment. No doubt the board of parole thought he could
be trusted to go and sin no more. The event proved that they
were wrong, but, had it been otherwise, public justice had not
been satisfied by depriving him of his liberty for so short a term.
Public justice demands serious punishment for serious offenses.
Sineon E. Baldwin.
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